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Introduction  
What happens when a major on-line computer system goes down? Some transaction processing systems 
(TPS) simultaneously service tens of thousands of dependent users. "A transaction processing system is a 
computerized system that performs and records the daily routine transactions necessary to conduct the 
business...In the business environment of the 1990s, TPS failure for a few hours can spell the demise of a 
firm and perhaps other firms linked to it." (Laudon and Laudon, 1995: 37)  
This research addresses the question, "What strategies do managers employ to operate critical transaction 
processing systems (TPS) at high levels of reliability?" Systems managers try to keep these systems 
operating at levels of reliability well above 99%. How do they do it? The study develops models about the 
effects of two specific strategies. A strategy is a means towards a goal. 
To our knowledge, no research has been done on this question, in spite of an early warning that system 
reliability is important (Lucas, 1975). In fact, few have studied the more general topic of system operations 
(Ives, Hamilton and Davis, 1980). Lyytinen and Hirschheim's (1987) topical review of "information system 
failures," however, briefly discusses operational reliability. Furthermore, information Systems (IS) 
textbooks are beginning to discuss reliability issues (e.g., Laudon and Laudon, 1995). 
To initiate research on this topic, we focused on the strategic level. We hope to benefit IS managers 
through strategic-level research. We describe complex issues surrounding two strategies (implementation 
testing controls and "lights dim") that an IS organization uses to manage its highly critical TPS. 
Paradoxically, the two strategies designed to improve TPS reliability also hold significant potential to 
decrease reliability. We chose to study one large, critical TPS at XYZCo, an organization in the 
travel/hospitality industry. XYZCo operates its TPS at over 99.8% reliability. 
Research Framework 
Lyytinen and Hirschheim (1987) recommended that system failures should be researched via a systems 
approach. This approach assumes that failure causes are complex and interactive. Others agree, both in IS 
research (Lucas, 1975) and in the industrial danger reference discipline (Hale and Glendon, 1987).  
Figure 1 displays our research framework. This framework's large box synthesizes the frameworks of 
Bostrom and Heinen (1977) and Orlikowski (1992). The framework's research approach allows us to 
understand the interactive effects of management strategies upon these systems. As described below, 
strategies affect reliability through the interactive super-system constituted by these four systems. These 
systems also impact strategies. The Individual System focuses on the perceptions, traits, knowledge, and 
capabilities of people. The Technical System encompasses the computer system, its physical environment, 
and operator tools. The Structural System refers to the formal aspects of organization (e.g., official 
positions and roles, procedures, and official measurement/incentive systems). The Social System involves 
the informal interaction roles and relationships that exist among workers. 
Figure 1 Research Framework 
 
Methodology 
This research is part of a larger grounded theory research study examining what contributes to TPS 
reliability. Since it builds and tests theoretical models directly from qualitative data, grounded theory is best 
suited for studying new or complicated phenomena (as in our case). Our data so far consist of taped 
interviews of twenty managers and technicians who operate XYZCo's TPS. We analyzed the data through 
grounded theory's open- and axial coding methods (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), in order to induce and relate 
theoretical concepts. We iterated between data gathering, analysis and model building. To assure reliability 
and construct validity, we: a) used the constant comparative method to be sure each data item properly 
supports a unique concept or relationship between concepts (cf. Orlikowski, 1993); b) documented, through 
cross-referencing software, how each segment of data is transformed into conceptual form; c) retraced the 
linkages between data and corresponding concepts and relationship; d) searched the data again to try to find 
counter-evidence to our models.  
Current Status 
A portion of the twenty interviews have been analyzed. Findings reported here are primarily descriptive. 
These descriptions contribute by identifying two difficult systems operations issues that merit further 
research. From the open and axial coding, we are developing a detailed theoretical model of what leads to 
TPS reliability at XYZCo. 
Findings to Date 
I. Implementation Testing Controls and Change  
Management employs a strategy of protecting the TPS against application complexity. XYZCo's TPS 
consists of about 35,000 interacting segments of real time application code. New code enters the system 
weekly, and over 30,000 segments are changed each year. Thompson (1967) predicted that the Structural 
System will deal with complexity and uncertainty by protecting the Technical system from environmental 
threats. We found that management has placed tight implementation controls around the TPS. Before a new 
or modified application goes on-line, it must pass a series of rigorous tests and must gain applications 
manager approvals.  
However, these controls and a recent change in the Structural System produce potentially system-harmful 
conflict. In 1993, management structurally separated the operations function from the applications function. 
The two organizations now have different incentive systems (Figure 2). While the operations group is 
strongly incented to keep system reliability high, the applications group is incented to move code into 
production quickly. Contrary to what one might expect, however, this has only produced minor conflicts 
between the two groups. Since individuals from the two groups have worked together for many years, 
cooperation is still the norm. Hence, the Social System moderates the conflict produced by the Structural 
System. However, if this buffer's strength decreases, incentive-driven conflict may lead to the 
implementation of application segments that are not fully tested. This would decrease TPS reliability 
(Figure 2). So paradoxically, the combination of the incentive system change and the system protection 
strategy may produce results contrary to management objectives. 
Figure 2 Structural System Impacts on Reliability  
 
II. Towards "lights dim:" A Balancing Act  
Management has adopted a strategy to move toward a "lights dim" environment, which means almost total 
automation of on-site operator functions. Management's motivation is two-fold: a) greater TPS reliability, 
by preventing the twenty-five or thirty operator errors still made each year; b) reduced costs through fewer 
personnel. Of "those things that have caused the availability to miss...100%, at least fifty percent of the 
time, you're going to find a human." A number of automation efforts have already yielded good results at 
XYZco. Management has formed a task force to design additional steps towards "lights dim." 
As discussed below, going to "lights dim" is not merely a Technical System exercise. Management must 
grapple with three Individual System issues: complacency, incomprehensibility, and demotivation. To 
effectively pursue lights dim, management must balance people issues with technology issues. 
A. Complacency  
We found that operators need to be alert (attentive) to early warning signals in order to quickly solve 
system problems. Automation of operator functions may negatively affect alertness (Figure 3-A). Through 
case studies, Lee (1991) found that industrial operators can become complacent as their function becomes 
more computerized. Complacency means operators come to rely almost completely on automation. Hence, 
they become less alert to problem signals. When operations automation goes wrong, the operator may 
doubt there is a problem (Lee, 1991), and thus may react too slowly, extending the outage. 
B. Incomprehensibility  
(Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1987)  
Currently, the system is complex enough that no one person understands all of its inner workings. When 
asked who was responsible for solving one major outage, respondents could only identify the team, not the 
individual. Automation of operations adds another layer of system incomprehensibility (Figure 3-B). The 
term system comprehensibility means the extent to which it is possible to understand how a system works. 
Zuboff (1984), Perrow (1984) and Lee (1991) found that when systems run systems, the added complexity 
increases incomprehensibility. Hence, their diagnoses and system interventions are as likely to make things 
worse as to fix the problem (Perrow, 1984).  
 
TPS Reliability 
C. Demotivation  
Currently, the organization relies heavily on its people (a) to guard the system from problems, and (b) to fix 
the system quickly when it fails. Operations people pride themselves on their ability to diagnose failures 
and bring the complicated system back on-line in very few minutes. One manager said, "Pride is what's got 
[us] where [we] are, and pride is what's going to continue to get [us] the goals [we] have established." 
Operators enjoy their jobs, and feel excited by the challenge of keeping the system running. However, the 
"lights dim" strategy may alter operator motivation (Figure 3-C). First, decreased human intervention and 
control tends to decrease the autonomy, feedback and task significance that lead to motivational work 
outcomes (Hackman and Oldham, 1980). Second, as one XYZCo manager pointed out, the possibility of 
losing one's job to a machine is a very demotivating prospect (Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1987).  
These three potential negative effects must be considered within the context of how the system is kept 
running today. When asked who is essential to keeping the system running, respondents answered with 
long lists of people and functions. Diagnosing and fixing the system requires a large virtual network of 
specialists. The specific system problem determines whose expertise is required. A wide variety of 
problems arise--seemingly at random, making it difficult to remove a specialist from an operator's list of 
those to call when the system encounters problems.  
This means that management is completely dependent on the cooperation of numerous expert employees to 
keep the system running. Realizing this, a manager responded to the question of how do you keep the TPS 
running: "First, there's lots of teamwork." In the past, employees have taken significant pride in their jobs 
and in the organization. However, the "lights dim" strategy could lower morale and cause turnover in key 
positions. Such Individual System outcomes may reduce TPS reliability--the opposite of what 
management's "lights dim" strategy intends. 
Contribution/Future Research Directions 
This study reports an interesting paradox: two strategies management employs to increase system reliability 
may have the unintended effect of reducing reliability. Management must carefully manage the related 
people issues to avoid these pitfalls. The completion of this study will yield a set of models that explain key 
issues and processes related to TPS reliability.  
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